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The course of human history has shown that there is no guaranteed method of conquest and expansion. Large scale armies can crush opponents, but they can also be outmaneuvered or rendered ineffective by terrain; yet more maneuverable forces can be beaten by 
superior force when constricted by terrain. Changes in tactics can make what was 
an advantage one day a liability the next. There are even situations in which the 
circumstances make a conventional military offensive an inefficient or ineffective 
way for an empire to spread its control and influence. Furthermore, growing 
empires are confronted with a wide variety of circumstances - geographical, 
tactical and strategic - from region to region and people to people. As a result, 
an essential feature for empires seeking significant expansion has been the 
ability to recognize and adapt, specifically the ability to recognize the specific 
requirements of the situation and adapt their course of action accordingly. In the 
history of imperial China, the Qin and Han dynasties both demonstrated this 
ability to utilize methods of warfare and expansion as dictated by circumstances 
in order to bring about success. The Qin built their military to exploit the 
weaknesses of the feudal armies of the Chinese states opposing them, while the 
Han utilized combinations of large-scale armies, maneuverability, colonization, 
military adventurers operating independently of the imperial court and small 
expeditions to expand their domain.
Before the ascension of the Qin and Han Dynasties, China was a land divided. 
The nearly two centuries prior to Qin unification are known to historians as 
the Warring States Period, and with good reason. The Zhou king, whose 
theoretical domain was much of China, was but a figurehead, powerless to 
intervene as leaders of numerous regional states intrigued and battled to extend 
the portions of China under their control. These leaders were frequently the 
feudal lords who were in principle vassals of the Zhou king. At the height of 
their power, the Zhou had used a feudal system to rule China. Noblemen of 
the landed aristocracy took oaths of loyalty to the Zhou king, and in return 
were responsible for ruling over their particular domain. All administrative and 
military positions were appointed by and responsible to the lord. Each region 
had such a system under its particular lord, encompassing officials high and low 
within the civil administration and military, from ministers and commanders 
down through the ranks to the serfs, who, bound to the land, formed the bottom 
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of the feudal hierarchy.1 The result was the creation of political 
and military hierarchies that were highly decentralized. As the 
power of the Zhou waned, these feudal domains became de facto 
states unto themselves, with the lords becoming the leaders who 
struggled for supremacy. Such struggles continued until the rise 
of the Qin, whose conquest restored unity to China. In working 
to consolidate their power, the Qin established the centralized 
bureaucracy necessary to the direct rule of a large empire by 
an imperial court, and its successor dynasty, the Han, extended 
and solidified the work begun by the Qin. These two dynasties 
thus began the administrative system that would characterize 
imperial China for many dynasties to come, making the methods 
they used to expand to the position from which they were able 
to influence the development of bureaucratic rule throughout 
China an essential element of Chinese imperial history.
Prior to Qin expansion, the method of Chinese warfare matched 
the feudal nature of Chinese politics. Feudal lords raised their 
armies through levies of the peasants under their control. Such 
armies were limited by the nature of their composition. Farmers 
could only be called away from their fields at certain times of 
year. Not only did this limit the duration of feudal campaigns, 
but it also limited their range, as with less time to march out 
and return, an army cannot go as far afield. This range factor 
was further compounded by the fact that those peasants who 
composed feudal armies simply did not like campaigning a 
significant distance from their homes and fields.2 Thus, feudal 
society yielded feudal armies that were hampered by their very 
feudal nature.
The political results of warfare between these feudal armies were 
as constricted as the forces themselves. As long as they became 
vassals of the victor, defeated lords retained control over their 
lands. They had to pay tribute to their new feudal master, but 
as they retained powers such as tax collection, their power base 
endured even in defeat.3 As a result, allegiances and tributaries 
were ever shifting, “altering the grouping but not the structure 
of power.”4 So while this system did bring defeated regions under 
the control of the victorious power, the conquered states retained 
such autonomy that the political situation remained ever fluid.
It was amidst this backdrop that the Qin moved to conquer the 
rest of China. To do so, the Qin developed a military that 
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would be able to exploit the inherent weaknesses of the feudal 
armies that opposed them. The most fundamental adaptation the 
Qin made was to create a professional army. Having no crops 
to tend or harvest, professional soldiers could be deployed year 
round, making their use a huge advantage over feudal powers. 
Furthermore, with these professional troops, the Qin emphasized 
sheer numbers and maneuverability.5 In order to overwhelm 
the feudal armies, which were constantly gaining or losing 
detachments based on any number of local factors that could 
draw men away from the army for a portion or the duration of 
the campaign, the Qin developed their army “as the most massive 
striking force of the age.”6 But this army was built on more than 
just sheer numbers; in order to exploit the limited range of feudal 
armies, the Qin army deployed a strong cavalry force that had 
incorporated the most useful aspects of the non-Chinese peoples 
who lived on their borders.7 Size and speed therefore gave the 
Qin army two major tactical advantages over the other Chinese 
states, and in utilizing them it was, in part, “this cavalry, trained 
in Frontier warfare, whose rapid maneuver and striking power 
won an empire for Ch’in [Qin].”8 
But it was not just in tactics that the Qin differed from feudal 
China; they also pursued a different set of goals. The Qin fought 
for total victory and absolute conquest; not merely content 
to add the defeated lord and his territory to the realm as an 
additional feudal appendage, administered by the defeated lord’s 
administrators, as was the prevailing practice, the Qin sought to 
bring the vanquished region under the direct control of the Qin 
emperor and his bureaucracy. The result was the first uniform 
implementation of a new set of strategies, vastly different from 
those of the feudal states. In order to obliterate the independent 
structure of a newly subjugated state, the victorious Qin wiped 
out the entirety of the vanquished royal house. Yet this was 
just the tip of the iceberg. Whenever the Qin won a battle as 
part of its conquest of China, the entirety of the defeated army 
was annihilated by decapitation. But this was never capricious 
slaughter; it was policy. In the face of such complete destruction, 
the feudal power structure of the defeated state could not 
remain intact, not with both lord and those who fought for him 
dead.9 Thus, the brutality of Qin conquest existed for an explicit 
purpose, facilitating the consolidation of victory into conquest 
and conquest into empire.
While the Qin Dynasty was short-lived, the more lasting Han 
Dynasty would prove itself equally adept at adapting their military 
techniques to fit the particular circumstances of the campaign. 
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In the second century BCE, the long-reigning Emperor Wudi 
engaged in a series of campaigns against the Xiongnu, the nomadic 
people of the Asia steppe along China’s northern frontier. He sent 
out huge armies to fight the tribesmen, with one army reaching 
300,000 men and several others of over 100,000 troops.10 But 
numbers alone could not carry the day on the steppe, forcing 
China to adapt to the requirements of the terrain.
The grassland of the Asian steppe lends itself to cavalry warfare. 
Living in this region made the nomads expert horsemen, as 
mobility was vital to surviving on the sparse steppe. Additionally, 
the requirements of hunting on the steppe made its inhabitants 
highly skilled with the bow and arrow. That they learned, in part 
as a requirement of hunting on the steppe, to combine these two 
skills and shoot their bows while mounted made the Xiongnu 
all the more deadly a foe.11 Xiongnu warfare was thus perfectly 
suited to the terrain in which they lived.
Thus, in order to defeat the Xiongnu in their own territory, 
the Chinese had to fight like the Xiongnu. The Han therefore 
incorporated Xiongnu tactics into their armies, relying heavily 
on cavalry forces to counter the mounted nomads.12 As crucially, 
campaigning deep in the Asian steppe took the Chinese armies 
far from their frontier bases. This resulted in long supply lines 
that became ever longer as the Chinese drove back the Xiongnu.13 
Given the mobility of the Xiongnu as a result of their horsemanship, 
this left the Chinese in a precarious position, susceptible to being 
cutoff from supplies and encircled. Neutralizing this vulnerability 
involved learning to live off of the steppe as the Xiongnu did.14 By 
thus achieving independence from their bases, the Chinese armies 
were able to extend their range even further and, unburdened by 
supply trains, become more mobile. Thus, that the Han were able 
to defeat the Xiongnu and move deep into the Asian steppe was 
a result of the fact that when Emperor Wudi deployed massive 
armies against the Xiongnu, he did so “with troops that matched 
the nomads in mobility and striking power.”15 But in the south, 
the Han could not effectively deploy massive armies of any kind. 
First of all, the terrain prevented it. Southward expansion brought 
the Han into a region of swamps, mountains and thick jungles 
entirely unsuited to the deployment, maneuver and use of armies 
numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, the 
peoples native to this region did not typically fight in organized 
armies. They would resist incursion every step of the way, but the 
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set-piece battle was not to be had.16 Thus, the primary role of the 
imperial army was to maintain garrisons to protect Han gains 
after they were made.17
In light of this reduced role for Chinese armies, southern expansion 
took on two main forms, the first of which was colonization. 
Chinese settlers were sent south along the rivers to establish 
themselves in the new territory. These settlers brought with them 
Chinese goods, creating a trade relationship that marked the first 
stage of tying the people of the region to China. The settlers of 
course also brought with them their culture, exposure to which 
instigated the process of assimilation through which China would 
incorporate these southern regions. Once a region was possessed 
of a sufficiently high number of settlers, the imperial government 
was able to send south administrators to oversee the region and 
promote the process of assimilating the natives to its fullest.18 In 
this way the Han were able to add territory to their empire with 
minimal conflict.
The second method for establishing control over the south was 
through adventurers. The most famous of these men to be active 
in the south was Chao Tuo, whose career spanned from the final 
years of the Qin to the reign of the Han emperor Wudi. After 
marrying into a clan of the Yue in what is now Guangdong province 
in south China, he was able to systematically build a powerbase 
for the creation of his own domain. As Chao continued to expand 
his territory as a self-proclaimed king, the first Han emperor 
enlisted him as a vassal. While Chao did not allow himself to be 
constricted by this relationship, continuing to campaign on his 
own accord and conquering part of present day Vietnam, after 
his death Emperor Wudi was able to assert control over those 
who succeed Chao to rule his domains.19 Chao Tuo thus serves 
of an example of how, in terrain in which large Chinese armies 
could not operate efficiently, the military adventurer could use 
local forces to build a kingdom that could later be incorporated 
into the greater Chinese empire.
Meanwhile, in the west, expansion into Central Asia posed 
another set of problems for the Han Dynasty. Central Asia is a 
barren and often desert region, interspersed with a number of 
settled oases. As such, this landscape provided little opportunity 
for colonization. Additionally, as it lay far from the center of the 
Han Empire, distance and desert thus served to isolate the region 
and any Chinese presence there from the rest of the empire.20 
Furthermore, as at each oasis there was an established society that 
could provision a Chinese force, “war among the oases of Central 
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Asia required only that the field force not be too cumbrous to 
make long marches yet strong enough to overawe each oasis 
it entered.”21 The former requirement effectively ruled out the 
use of massive armies on the scale of Wudi’s steppe campaigns. 
Combined, all of these factors severely curtailed the options 
available to the Han for expansion into Central Asia.
The result of these constraints was that individual commanders 
of small detachments were able to operate in Central Asia with 
almost complete autonomy. Among such leaders was Ban Chao, 
brother of the famous female scholar Ban Zhao. Ban Chao was 
sent to Central Asia in the first century CE with thirty-six men 
to promote and protect Chinese interests in the region. During 
his nearly three decades in Central Asia, despite rarely receiving 
any reinforcements or direction from the Han Empire, Ban 
Chao successfully spread Chinese influence at the expense of 
the Xiongnu.22 Ban Chao accomplished this through what the 
Chinese came to call “containing barbarians with barbarians.”23 
He made alliances with certain oasis powers and, exploiting long 
standing animosities among the peoples of the region, used them 
to fight against other groups that were potential threats to Chinese 
interests.24 He was thereby able to shape the politics of Central 
Asia and draw the area into the Chinese orbit, placing China on 
the Xiongnu’s western flank instead of having the Xiongnu on 
China’s, all with a modicum of Chinese military presence.
Thus, the first two dynasties to rule over a unified China following 
the Warring States Period demonstrated skill in adapting to the 
particular attributes of a situation. The Qin did so by developing an 
army that would be able to exploit the inherent vulnerabilities of 
the feudal armies deployed by its rivals. In subsequent centuries, 
the Han made a number of adaptations as they expanded their 
empire on multiple fronts. In the north, they utilized large 
armies that learned how to maneuver, live and fight on the 
steppe as their enemy, the Xiongnu, did. To the south, where 
such methods would have been largely futile, the Han utilized 
policies of colonization and adventurers to bind the region to the 
empire. And in the west, it was the autonomous commander who 
advanced the cause of the Han by playing the various peoples of 
Central Asia off of each other in order to bring the region under 
the influence of China. In seeking to extend their realms, the Qin 
and Han Dynasties proved to be flexible in how they utilized 
military force to facilitate expansion and empire.
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